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Writers on feminist ethics have identified philosophy’s masculine biases, which 
prevent it understanding ordinary lives and the place of care within them, and 
particularly the moral experience of women. Typically, it has effectively 
presented men’s morality – that is, the morality of men in liberal, patriarchal 
societies - as universal (Baier, 1994; Held, 2006; Jaggar, 1992; Kittay, 1999; 
Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Tronto, 1994). In this contribution I want to add to those 
critiques by arguing that much philosophy and social science uses common 
frameworks that render care difficult to understand adequately. Most broadly, 
they fail to acknowledge that our relation to the world is one of concern. Because 
of our psychological and physical vulnerability, our dependence on others, and 
our capacity for diverse actions, and because of contingency, we are necessarily 
evaluative beings, continually having to monitor and evaluate how we and the 
things we care about are faring, and decide what to do.  
 
There are several reasons for these deficiencies. One is the persistence of a set of 
interrelated conceptual distinctions related to the fact-value distinction. 
Dichotomised views of facts and values, is and ought, reason and emotion, mind 
and body are especially obstructive. Another is the tendency for academics to 
project features of their own contemplative relation to the world onto those they 
study. Lastly, there is often an inadequate understanding of social being and of 
embodiment, of the relations between the biological and the cultural, or more 
specifically between body, brain, mind and environment. Together these 
tendencies produce a pervasive anti-naturalism which is reluctant to 
acknowledge our universal neediness and vulnerability, and a kind of 
rationalism that marginalizes anything that cannot be reduced to or controlled 
by reasoning and discourse. Not just philosophy but much of western thought 
still has Cartesian residues. If philosophy’s wider goal is to expand the realm of 
reason and to subject everything to its scrutiny, so as to develop more rational 
ways of life, then while this has obvious attractions, it also has hazards. 
 
In this contribution, I want to explore and dismantle some of these obstacles. I 
shall begin by elaborating the idea that our relation to the world is one of 
concern, then go on to show how fact-value and related distinctions inhibit our 
understanding of this relation.  Next I deal with various academic 
misrepresentations of practice, social being, and embodiment, and end with 




A relation to the world of concern 
                                                        
1 In this piece I have drawn extensively on my book Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, 
Values and Ethical Life (Sayer, 2011). 
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While this Handbook is about care, understood primarily as looking after others, 
in English the word also has a broader meaning as in ‘caring about things’, such 
as our loved ones, our health, appearance, conduct, diet, work, political issues, 
favourite sport, music, art or landscapes, right up to the state of humanity and 
the plight of the planet. If we didn’t care about anything, it’s doubtful if we could 
survive, for whether we flourished or put ourselves in mortal danger would be a 
matter of indifference.  
 
In other words, our relation to the world is one of concern. Although ‘concern’ is 
sometimes associated with anxiety, it is used here in a broader sense to cover the 
fact that things matter to us.  They do so because they affect whether we flourish 
or suffer. It can also be used as a count noun (‘concerns’) where it denotes the 
particular things that happen to matter to us, such as those just noted. Clearly 
our concerns extend far beyond immediate physical needs to the attachments 
and commitments we form. It implies that we are a certain kind of being – not 
just capable of reason, but needy, desiring beings who can flourish or suffer in a 
host of ways. People sometimes value the things they care about more than 
themselves, but then those concerns have become a part of who they are rather 
than something separable. While our lives can be enriched by relationships and 
practices that bring meaning, interest, satisfaction and fulfilment, in becoming 
dependent on them we become vulnerable to their loss or damage, and can 
suffer as a result. Hence our relation to the world of concern.  
 
At one level, this is elementary, but social science and philosophy often have 
difficulties acknowledging and doing justice to concern, and within this, the 
nature and place of care for others in life. The reasons lie deep in the basic 
assumptions of those disciplines and much modern western liberal thought. 
It can therefore easily fail to acknowledge what is most important to people. 
Anthropologists, for example, have often taken more interest in rituals around 
death and bereavement than in the suffering experienced by people at such 
times (Rosaldo, 1989). Concepts such as ‘values’, ‘norms’ or ‘self-interest’ fail to 
do justice to such matters, particularly with regard to their social character and 
their connection to the events and social relations they are about, and their 
emotional force.   
 
 
The fact-value family of dichotomies 
 
Many of the difficulties are created by what I call the fact-value family of 
dichotomies, which might be represented thus   
 
fact - value 
 
     is – ought 
 
reason - emotion 
 
science – ideology 
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 science - ethics 
 
 positive - normative 
 
objectivity – subjectivity 
 
mind - body 
 
As distinctions intended to note differences these do have their uses, but as 
dichotomies, as opposites, they are likely to mislead. Not only are there 
overlooked middle terms, such as emotional reason, or the objectivity (reality) of 
subjectivity, but each side of the dichotomies has its own internal 
differentiations. The terms are related not only horizontally, as putative 
opposites, but vertically as equivalents, so that associations of each term seep 
into those above or below. Thus, in combination, this vertical mutual 
reinforcement and horizontal polarization and exclusion encourages us to 
assume that values are emotional, and that neither values nor emotions have 
anything to do with facts or reasons or objectivity. The things on the left might 
seem absolute; those on the right - with the exception of the body - relative. 
Sometimes the things on the right seem like unruly forces threatening to 
overwhelm us and make us ‘lose our heads’, while those on the left might be 
things we have to face up to, though we can do so actively, without coercion, 
using our heads (Blackburn, 1998. p.88). As feminist authors have pointed out, 
the dualisms also tend to be gendered (masculine-left, feminine-right), and there 
are further alignments with other gendered dualisms, particularly those of 
thought and feeling, public and private, nature and culture (for example, 
Haraway, 1985; Le Doeuff, 1989). Although many social scientists are aware of 
some of these issues, and imagine they have escaped from this framework, many 
are actually still trapped by them. 
 
Let us deal with fact-value, and is-ought first. Imagine going to your doctor to 
have your blood pressure taken. On being given the two numbers, one over the 
other, you ask ‘is that good or bad? What ought I to do about it?’ Imagine if your 
doctor replied, ‘I can’t tell you because that would be a value-judgment and 
would compromise my objectivity, and I can’t advise you what you should do 
because you can’t derive an ought from an is.’ Yet despite the evident stupidity of 
such responses, many social scientists regularly say such things, and appeal to 
philosophy for support.  
 
Why is the response so ridiculous? First there is the treatment of facts and values 
as opposed and incompatible, reflected in the common assumption that the 
‘intrusion’ of ‘value-judgments’ can only be a threat to objectivity. This view is 
shared both by conservatives who want to minimise the role of values in order to 
protect objectivity, and radicals who, in opposing them, acknowledge the 
unavoidability of values, but assume that this means abandoning objectivity. The 
radicals often imagine themselves to be challenging the fact-value dichotomy, 
but they are still trapped within it. What both sides fail to realise is that it’s 
possible for evaluative judgements to be true. If the doctor had said your blood 
pressure reading indicated your health was poor, she might be right. In principle, 
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her diagnosis would be fallible, but that’s a general epistemological problem, not 
something restricted to value-judgements or evaluations (blood pressure 
readings themselves are fallible). What both the conservatives and the radicals 
overlook here is a slide between two distinct and contingently related meanings 
of ‘objective’ - the first referring to ‘value-freedom’, the second referring to 
statements that are ‘true’. Having values and evaluating things as good or bad in 
various ways does not necessarily prevent one achieving an objective (true, or 
practically-adequate) understanding of some social phenomenon. Sometimes 
values may obstruct our enquiries, but sometimes they may help (Anderson, 
2004). More ‘valuey’ descriptions may be factually more accurate than more 
neutral ones, as this famous example shows: to say that millions were 
systematically exterminated in the Holocaust is factually more adequate than to 
say merely that millions died in the Holocaust. 
 
Consider two further examples. If I say that millions of people are suffering in 
Syria, I’m making a claim that is both factual and evaluative. If a social worker 
claims that a child is being abused, she is not merely projecting arbitrary ‘value-
judgments’ onto an indifferent object, but making a claim about the child’s state 
of being. Again, like any claims, they are fallible, but it wouldn’t help to try to 
separate fact from value here, for suffering is a state of being, not merely an 
external judgment; and if you don’t know that it’s bad, you don’t know what it is. 
As living, sentient beings, we are capable of flourishing or suffering, and if we 
don’t know whether or in what ways an individual or group is flourishing or 
suffering, we simply don’t know much about them. Significantly, it’s in the 
domain of things to do with well-being that the fact-value dichotomies break 
down, for to understand such matters we need evaluative description, including 
‘thick ethical concepts’, like ‘kindness’, ‘respect’, ‘courage’, ‘abuse’, ‘humiliation’ 
or ‘racism’. These are not only more evaluative than thin ethical terms, like ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’, but more informative too; again, the factual and evaluative content of 
accounts can sometimes be positively rather than inversely related. Just where it 
matters most, the fact-value distinction splits us in two and occludes what it is 
happening. ‘Care’ itself is a thick ethical concept, for it can’t be distinguished 
from other behaviour without some normative/evaluative content as to what is 
good for those concerned. If behaviour clearly failed to approach those 
normative standards, we might not just call it ‘bad care’ but decide to refuse it 
the label of care altogether.  
 
The related distinction between positive (descriptive) and normative thought, in 
which the former is defined as world-guided and the latter world-guiding, also 
breaks down with regard to sentient beings. For to be in a state of suffering is 
normally (in the absence of overriding factors) to desire escape and relief; to be 
hungry is to desire and seek food, to be lonely is to want company, to be anxious 
is to want security and assurance. Concern, desire, longing and sense of lack do 
not merely passively register a difference between two states, one that is given, 
and one that does not exist, but involve an impulse, drive or pressure to move 
towards the latter. They are thus world-guided in responding to the difference 
and world-guiding in seeking to resolve it. Life, or ‘life-force’, is precisely about 
moving or trying to move between states of being. As research on attachment in 
infants shows, the newborn actively seeks not only the breast, but attachment, 
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connection, reassurance and care, and its gaze is drawn to its primary carer’s 
face. We are always positioned between things as they are and as we want them 
to be, between states of lack and states of fulfilment and flourishing, and we need 
continual replenishment. It’s what distinguishes the living from the dead. 
Between is and ought lie evaluative judgements, or, more basically, unarticulated 
feelings of desire or lack. We live on the slippery slope of lack, able to climb up it, 
and indeed often to extend it upwards by developing new forms of flourishing 
and protection. We are unable to resist sliding down it except by continually 
climbing back up by defending and seeking to improve our situation. 
 
I’m using terms like ‘life-force’ and ‘well-being’ here in very broad ways, that 
include but go beyond the physiological and the relief and avoidance of suffering, 
to the pursuit of flourishing. As Aristotelianism acknowledges, we have curiosity 
and a tendency to want to use and develop our skills and knowledge, and 
flourish. We develop attachments to others and commitments to practices, 
projects and causes, which become our concerns; through investing ourselves in 
them they become part of our identity, and our well-being comes also to depend 
on their flourishing. The music lover cannot flourish if denied the opportunity to 
hear or make music, the religious person cannot flourish if her religious practices 
are repressed. Thus, good care helps us not merely physically but, through 
attending to the particular attachments and commitments that we have 
developed in our lives, and our potential to develop new ones, helps us flourish 
in this broader human sense. 
 
But converts to the fact-value dichotomy and the no-ought-from-is argument 
tend to be persistent, often thinking that they have the weight of philosophical 
argument on their side.2 The standard approach deals with whether a statement 
of fact can logically entail an ought statement. From the statement ‘A is starving 
and B has lots of spare food which she could easily give to A’, it doesn’t logically 
(deductively) follow that ‘B ought to give A food’. The argument is correct. But if 
B said she doesn’t need to give A any food because ought does not follow from is, 
we would wonder about her sanity as well as her ethics. The problem is that 
logic is about the relation between statements, not about the relation between 
states of being. A starving person does not need to establish a logical relation 
between statements about her condition and statements concluding that she 
should have food, she just needs food, and the force of the ought here comes not 
from logic but from the body. Natural necessity cannot be reduced to logical 
necessity.3  
 
                                                        
2 Actually they don’t: see, for example, Anderson, 2004; Appiah, 2008; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 
2003; Geuss, 2008; MacIntyre, 1998; Putnam, 2002, Taylor, 1967; 1985; Williams, 1985. 
3 Some philosophers (e.g. Popper) rejected the notion of natural necessity because they assumed 
it requires claims that are irrefutable, because true by definition, but such claims are actually 
fallible empirical claims, based on inferences about what things can and can’t do (Harré and 
Madden, 1975). (Those who reject the notion confuse epistemology (the relation between 
thought and the world) with ontological matters (to do with the relation between parts of the 
world).) When we feel confident about such a claim, we sometimes make it part of the definition 
of the object (Harré and Madden, 1975, p. 80). 
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The relation between needs and wants and their satisfaction is contingent – 
otherwise they wouldn’t be needs and wants, or a role for care. But that in no 
way reduces their force – on the contrary. Again, the force of the ought is not a 
matter of logical relations between statements. As we shall see, the error of 
‘logicism’ - of mistaking logical relations between statements for relations 
between things or states of beings - is widespread in philosophy, and in much of 
social science. 
 
But the problems go deeper - to the interpretation of the individual terms of the 
fact-value dichotomies too, particularly in the case of reason. Part of the problem 
here is the modernist tendency to reduce reason to the ‘horizontal’, particularly 
logical, relations within discourse between statements, and to ignore its 
‘aboutness’, its ‘vertical’ relation to what it denotes. Whether reasoning can 
inform successful practice depends on how it relates to what it is about, whether 
it finds an adequate way of capturing the character and behaviour of the objects 
that it seeks to comprehend. Older senses of reason and ‘reasonableness’ allude 
to this vertical relation; a reasonable person isn’t primarily someone who can 
follow logic, but someone who attends to the specificities of the situation, 
particularly those of the people they deal with - a characteristic particularly 
important in care relations (Sayer, 2011). The fact-value framework positions 
values in opposition to reason and as arbitrary, rather than being, like reason in 
this older sense, about things and responsive to them.4 (Reason and values are 
both ‘intentional’, in philosophical terminology.) Thus, it tends to ignore the fact 
that we can change our values in response to new knowledge about the world.  
 
This emphasis on the ‘aboutness’ of reason and valuation is consistent with the 
emphasis in the ethic of care on attentiveness to the specificity of the other – to 
her specific needs, vulnerabilities, capacities, concerns or commitments, and as 
an individual with her own narratives. It can also be found in the Aristotelian 
tradition of philosophy, particularly with regard to its view of reason, expertise 
and wisdom (Dunne, 1993; Murdoch, 1970; Nussbaum, 2001; 2007). It 
downplays the role of rules and procedures, treating them as general and 
sometimes merely provisional rules of thumb that always need adjusting in the 
light of the specificities of the situation or person encountered. And it is 
repeated, attentive experience in dealing with variety that characterizes the 
skilled actor, not knowledge of texts, rules or general procedures (Benner, 1994). 
The skilled carer, like the skilled surgeon or tennis player, is responsive to the 
fact that every person, body or game is different. 
 
 
Further obstacles to understanding our relation to the world of concern 
 
There are further reasons behind the difficulties that social science and 
philosophy have in dealing with care and our relation to the world of concern. 
There is first what Pierre Bourdieu termed the ‘scholastic fallacy’. This involves 
the projection by academics’ of their contemplative, discursive relation to the 
world onto people whose relation to the world is primarily practical (Bourdieu, 
                                                        
4 In philosophical terminology, reason and values are both ‘intentional’.  
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2000). Academics’ removal from the pressures of practical activity also reflects 
their privileged social position. Philosophy’s preoccupation with reason and 
autonomy make it particularly liable to ignore or devalue practice, emotion, 
vulnerability, dependence and embodiment, and to marginalise psychological 
and sociological considerations.  
 
As we have seen, social scientists are generally trained to suspend normative 
judgement of the people and practices they study, and this can lead them to 
project this de-normativized view onto people, ignoring their relation to the 
world of concern, thereby producing alienated and alienating accounts of their 
behaviour. In life, the main questions we face are often not so much empirical 
but normative ones of how our concerns are faring, and what to do next and for 
the best, although a lot of such thinking is done semi-automatically through an 
acquired wisdom and feel for the games in which we play.  There is more than a 
trace of scientism in the bloodless descriptions of people we find in social 
science, like the ‘rational actor ‘or ‘the subject’. To be sure, we sometimes need 
these abstract concepts, but they also give the researcher an elevated status 
precisely because they are unlike those of everyday language. Further, there is 
often a kind of macho tendency to view the study of values, emotions and ethics 
as less scientific than the study of power, discourse, and social structure.  
 
Blending with these tendencies, and widely attacked by feminism, is the common 
presumption that the individuals that social science and philosophy deals with 
are self-sufficient, implicitly male, liberal adults, facing the world as independent 
decision makers, pursuing their ‘life projects’ and ‘conceptions of the good’, and 
in charge of what they do (Sevenhuijsen, 1998). On this view, any departures 
from such a model are viewed negatively, as signs of deficiencies, whether of 
individual rationality or social organization. 
 
This in turn belies a wholly inadequate understanding of our nature as social 
beings. At best, in this view, our social nature is simply a matter of our tendency 
to live in groups, and to use language. But our social character goes much deeper 
than this. What the dominant view overlooks, and apparently has difficulty 
stomaching, is our vulnerability and our dependence on others, not merely 
instrumentally but for our very personhood: we become who we are through our 
relationships. Our relations, especially to our more significant others, are 
internal, rather than external.  Perhaps inadvertently, in a private letter, Marx 
countered the dominant, masculinist liberal view; on the death of his 8 year old 
son, Edgar, he wrote:  
“Bacon says that really important people have so many relations to nature 
and the world, so many objects of interest, that they easily get over any 
loss. I am not one of those important people. The death of my child has 
shattered me to the very core and I feel the loss as keenly as on the first 
day. My poor wife is also completely broken down.” Letter to Lasalle, 
28/7/1855 
Yet liberalism tends to see dependence purely negatively and view relations 
between people as thin and external, as in contractual relations, rather than as 
constitutive of their identities. Dependence can indeed take extremely 
oppressive forms, but it can also take life-enriching ones, and of course it is a 
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necessity, experienced by us all (Fraser and Gordon, 1994). The adult male 
liberal individual is not a universal: the baby is. Yet infancy, along with disability, 
infirmity and senility, tend to be marginalized or ignored completely. 
Acknowledging that we all started off as helpless babies who needed to be held, 
loved, fed and have our bottoms wiped is not something that sits well with 
academics’ professional gravitas. 
 
Part of the problem here, again widely noted by feminism, is a common neglect 
or disdain for the body and any psychological or emotional processes not under 
the dominion of reason (Witt and Shapiro, 2015). These are things the modernist 
view of reason was supposed to allow us to ‘rise above’. At worst, causes are 
seen only as enemies, the body as heteronomy, while mental processes are 
reduced to those of conscious deliberation, and emotions are opposed to reason 
rather than seen as informative and intelligent. There also is the fallacy of 
assuming that only those things that distinguish humans from other species - 
whether culture or sociality or capacity for reason - are important in explaining 
behaviour.  
 
Yet while Cartesian mind-body dualism is often damned, it keeps returning in 
new, equally unsatisfactory guises, particularly as discourse-(over)-body or 
culture-(over)-nature (Calder, 2005). In part, this derives again from the 
scholastic fallacy but it is also influenced in social science by disciplinary 
imperialism – by pressures to expand the realm of the disciplines that study the 
cultural and social at the expense of the biological. But in order to acknowledge 
that we are cultural beings we need not deny that we are also biological beings, 
indeed the existence of cultures presupposes certain biological preconditions, 
particularly neurological complexity. As Lena Gunnarsson argues, understanding 
how nature underpins the social is  “not only compatible with theorising social 
change but necessary for any tenable account of how social processes work.” 
(2013, p.5). Yet, particularly in some strains of post-structuralism, there is a fear 
of conceding anything to biology – ‘nature-phobia’, as Gunnarsson calls it. It 
seems to be feared that any such concessions will lead to the treatment of 
phenomena which are culturally-specific as natural, universal and eternal, 
thereby limiting our freedom. But the error lies in regarding nature as 
immutable. We can and do change biological and other physical phenomena, 
indeed our freedom presupposes this. However, we can’t change just any thing in 
just any way through collective wishful thinking or ‘social construction’; we can 
only change them in accordance with their susceptibilities and capacities. We 
should not replace a deterministic view of nature with a kind of cultural 
voluntarism or idealism that can simply make of nature whatever it wishes.5 
 
Bodies are neither immutable nor simple cultural products and any shaping 
processes are always many-sided - dependent on the properties of what is being 
shaped as well as what is doing the shaping, indeed the shaping tends to be 
mutual. As neuroplasticity implies, our capacities develop through our lives, 
according to our experience, and at each point the development is dependent on 
what capacities and susceptibilities have already contingently been acquired 
                                                        
5 Judith Butler’s work on sex tends towards this voluntarism (Butler, 1993). 
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through earlier experience. Thus, one can’t teach a child philosophy or poetry 
until it has learnt a language.  
 
This shaping process can go well or badly, promoting well-being or ill-being. 
Attachment theory – one of the most successful theories in social science – shows 
that the way in which primary carers interact with infants from birth profoundly 
affects their ability to function as competent and well-balanced social actors in 
later life. It is through the way baby is held, cuddled, interacted with as well as 
fed that it learns how to respond to others and to the world. The provision of 
security and the attunement of the carer to the baby affect how its brain 
develops – in effect, how it is calibrated or tuned. The quality of these 
interactions – and they are primarily pre-linguistic - affects the development of 
neural pathways and emotional responses and dispositions. As Daniel Siegel put 
it, attachment “helps the immature brain use the mature functions of the parent’s 
brain to organise its own processes” (Siegel, 1999 p.67). For care in early life, 
this is fundamental. If we think of behaviour only on the model of discourse and 
‘interlocutors’, and regard the body and nature as purely ‘other’ and as having 
nothing to do with understanding and meaning, we will not understand this. 
 
Particularly in the case of care, it is not just mind-and-body but precisely the 
interactions between different levels of the body, brain, mind and environment 
that matter. Much of the regulation of the body and our responses to the world 
by the brain carries on regardless of whether we consciously recognise it, and 
sometimes despite what we want. For example, individuals of a nervous 
disposition may not be able to overcome such responses through reason, and 
may sometimes wonder why they feel anxious even when they can see no good 
reason to be, so they become anxious about their anxiety and exasperated with 
themselves and lose further self-esteem. However, they may find that through 
adopting certain forms of behaviour, such as abdominal breathing or meditation, 
they may, with practice, be able to calm such feelings more effectively than 
through deliberation. Many therapies use precisely such strategies. In other 
words, there are important interactions between the conscious and 
subconscious, the psychological and the physiological.  
 
Our reactions to others are partly controlled by processes that operate below 
our level of awareness, yet good care has to negotiate these. Research by Stephen 
Porges shows that the way we respond to others is partly controlled through 
mechanisms that subconsciously monitor their faces and voices and other 
environmental signals, and regulate our heart rates and middle ear muscles. 
Friendly faces and prosodic voices allow our heart rates to slow and our facial 
muscles to relax, and our ears to tune into others’ voices and distinguish them 
from background noise. Unresponsive or hostile expressions in others do not 
allow this relaxation, and keep the body in fight-or-flight mode, reducing our 
ability to listen and engage (Porges, 2011). Further, our reactions to proximity to 
others and being touched operate primarily at this subconscious level.6 
                                                        
6 I am indebted to Celia Roberts for bringing Porges’ work to my attention. The following 
interview provides a good introduction: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8tz146HQotY 
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Sometimes we may believe ourselves to be safe while our bodies tell us 
something different. 
 
So our relation of concern, caring about things, including other people, operates 
on a number of levels, from the subconscious – or the level of ‘neuroception’, as 
Porges calls it - controlling our heart rates, regulating hormones that stress or 
calm us, to feelings such as compassion, love, gratitude or worry, through to 
reasoning and reflection about these. There are also ‘top down’ processes 
through which certain willed thoughts and behaviour trigger, reinforce or 
change these subconscious processes. So we need to reject models of mind and 
body, or culture and nature as radically opposed, for there are a number of 
processes operating at different levels, with interactions between them. There 
are connections between the upper and lower brain, between the latter and the 
viscera, between left brain and right brain. These can operate unnoticed in the 
flow of everyday practice or be deliberately mobilised in various forms of 
therapy and care. 
 
Take, for example, the case of an elderly, lonely, infirm person being looked after 
by a carer. Good care for such a person involves not only the physiological work 
of caring for the body but respectful, friendly engagement with them as an 
individual with her own identity, biography, attachments and commitments, so 
as to affirm her sense of dignity, and make her feel recognised and valued. Yet it 
is not only a matter of what is said or done, but how - the carer’s demeanour, 
including the tone of voice, pacing of words and actions, facial expressions and 
other body language are all important. If done well, the care produces additional 
physiological benefits too in terms of reducing stress, releasing oxytocin and 
producing a sense of security, relaxation and contentment. Good carers may 
behave in these ways intuitively or because they have thought about it and 
realise their importance, but either way, when it works, it can do so without the 
intermediation of reason and reflection, indeed too much self-consciousness can 
obstruct it. Anti-naturalistic thinking that splits mind or discourse from the body 
can make no sense of things as ordinary as the way friendly treatment by others 
can lift our spirits and energise us when we are feeling low. 
 
It is because of these multiple levels – that understanding care requires an 
interdisciplinary – or better, postdisciplinary – approach that focuses on the 
processes linking domains conventionally seen as belonging to individual 




In conclusion: Implications for the organization of care 
 
Just as behaviour goes beyond the scope of conscious experience, so the ethic of 
care needs to engage with what goes on beyond the scope of reason. 
Psychological research shows that we are more likely to help others when we are 
in a good mood – which may depend on something as arbitrary as the weather or 
whether someone has just told us a good joke (Appiah, 2008). We might prefer to 
believe that we are immune to such arbitrary influences and would do the right 
Comment [AS1]: reference 
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thing regardless, but while that seems a good ideal, this finding should also alert 
us to the wisdom of everyday friendliness and making things nice for each other. 
The liberal individual who treats others with respect and always does ‘the right 
thing’ but shows no warmth or friendliness may fail to understand this, and fail 
to contribute to an atmosphere that encourages caring behaviour in others. For 
liberalism, ‘niceness’ is unimportant - at best a fringe benefit, at worst trivial and 
worthy of sneers. As Porges has shown, a friendly atmosphere helps us in 
subconscious as well as conscious ways to engage with others effectively. The 
importance of this has long been understood in folk wisdom, particularly 
amongst women, but less so among men and in business and professions, 
including academia. The ethic of care needs to go beyond individual acts and 
relationships of care to the construction of supportive atmospheres. 
 
In light of this, while the locus of care and concern lies primarily in individuals, 
the time pressures and quality of social relations within organisations as well as 
with clients are likely to make a difference. A highly pressured, competitive, 
unsupportive, work environment is hardly conducive to attentive, 
compassionate behaviour, and tends to encourage people to treat others as 
objects to be dealt with as quickly as possible rather than understood. It 
squeezes out concern. The formal and instrumental rationality that organizations 
operating under conditions of competition and scarcity prioritize tend to favour 
standardization and target-hitting rather than attentiveness to others and their 
specificities. Care without concern – or caring for without caring about - may 
allow routine physical tasks to be carried out and audit targets to be met, but 
that is all. And then of course there is the familiar figure of the self-important, 
impatient, usually male professional, ‘who doesn’t suffer fools’. Major 
inequalities of pay and status within organisations and between professionals 
and clients are also not conducive to empathy. Consequently, while an 
organization’s official ethos may emphasize care and the dignity of the client, 
whether it’s actualised depends on many things which at first sight may seem 
unrelated to care and which may threaten the achievement of ‘efficiency’. Care 
needs time. 
 
As Marx put it in the gendered language of his day, 'Man as an objective, 
sensuous being is therefore a suffering being - and because he feels that he 
suffers, a passionate being.’ (Marx, 1844). We can be well-fed or malnourished, 
healthy or sick, respected or despised and humiliated, powerful or powerless, 
supported or exploited, and loved or unloved; we can have a sense of self-worth 
or worthlessness, be stimulated or bored, happy or depressed, and so on. Hence 
our concerns. Concepts of human agency emphasize our capacity to do things, 
but our vulnerability, neediness and concerns are as important as our capacities, 
indeed the two sides are closely related, for the former can prompt us to act or 
fail to act. The fact-value and positive-normative dichotomies obscure what is 
central to life - the state of always being positioned between is and ought, while 
dichotomies of mind and body, discourse and body, or culture and nature 
obscure their internal differentiations and the connections between them. Care is 
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